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Economists are skeptical about the economic benefits of hosting “mega-events” such as the Olympic
Games or the World Cup, since such activities have considerable cost and seem to yield few tangible
benefits. These doubts are rarely shared by policy-makers and the population, who are typically quite
enthusiastic about such spectacles. In this paper, we reconcile these positions by examining the economic
impact of hosting mega-events like the Olympics; we focus on trade. Using a variety of trade models,
we show that hosting a mega-event like the Olympics has a positive impact on national exports. This
effect is statistically robust, permanent, and large; trade is around 30% higher for countries that have
hosted the Olympics. Interestingly however, we also find that unsuccessful bids to host the Olympics
have a similar positive impact on exports. We conclude that the Olympic effect on trade is attributable
to the signal a country sends when bidding to host the games, rather than the act of actually holding
a mega-event. We develop a political economy model that formalizes this idea, and derives the conditions
under which a signal like this is used by countries wishing to liberalize.
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mark.spiegel@sf.frb.org“But why, some say, the moon? Why choose this as our goal? ... We choose to go
to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things,
not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to
organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is
one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which
we intend to win...”
• John F. Kennedy, Sept 12, 1962
“When the Olympic ﬂame is lit, China will be hoping for a 17-day festival of sport
and international friendship. It sees the games as marking not just its re-emergence
as a global economic force but also as a country that the rest of the world treats
with admiration and respect.”
• Economist, August 2, 2008
1 Motivation
Economists are usually skeptical of arguments about the public provision of infrastructure for
sporting events, and rightly so. Agents that endorse the construction of new sports stadia or
the staging of mega-events usually do so out of naivety or self-interest. In practice, these events
usually end up imposing large costs on their hosts that are not nearly compensated by either the
revenues earned during the event or the legacy of large stadia or obscure facilities (velodromes,
aquatic centers, archery ranges, and so forth) that are left behind. Baade and Matheson (2002)
estimate that the city of Atlanta and the state of Georgia spent $1.58 billion on the 1996 Olympics,
which created 24,742 permanent jobs under their most optimistic scenario, or $63,860 per job. The
opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympic games are estimated to have cost at least $100
million when around 100 million Chinese live on less than $1/day.1
Despite the fact that most economists doubt the wisdom of such policy, there is little question
that countries commit substantial resources to become candidates to host mega-events, and much
more should they be “fortunate” enough to actually host the event. While there is usually a
vocal minority of opponents, the desire to host the Olympic games is widely held by the masses.
Moreover, there is a clear perception that national reputations are aﬀected by the experience of
hosting the Olympics. Subsequent to learning of his country’s failure to win the rights to host the
2012 summer games, the mayor of the ﬁrst arrondissement of Paris Jean-Francois Legaret lamented
1“Somehow, the good name of France seems to be at issue, and that makes the defeat even worse.”
[Graﬀ (2005)].
This paper examines the possibility that both sides of the argument may be right. In particular,
we show that there is a large economic beneﬁt associated with mega-events (justifying the public’s
enthusiasm), despite the fact that much of the requisite new infrastructure is a net cost (explaining
the skepticism of economists).
It is commonly argued that hosting the Olympics will promote a nation’s exports. For in-
stance, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) believes that potential visitors will be drawn
to Olympic venues after being exposed to them through the games. We are dubious of the practical
relevance of this argument, and thus begin by examining it empirically, using a number of diﬀerent
models of trade. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd strong evidence of a large positive eﬀect of the Olympics
on both exports and overall trade. Our results seem robust to a battery of sensitivity exercises
including tetradic and matching/treatment estimation; we show that countries which have hosted
the games seem to have exports some 30% higher, ceteris paribus. Other mega-events such as the
World Cup also have large positive eﬀects on trade. Somewhat surprisingly (at least to us), coun-
tries that host a mega-event seem to realize an economic beneﬁt in the form of greater openness.
If openness enhances growth (e.g., Lucas (2009)), the macroeconomic consequences of mega-events
may be large.
While our observed eﬀect is large and robust, it may be argued that it is attributable to
unobservable diﬀerences between those countries that host the games and those that don’t, rather
than a “hosting eﬀect.” To address this possibility, we compare trade patterns for countries that
host the games to those that bid unsuccessfully for the games. In using this alternative group as a
control, our methodology follows a large recent literature, such as Jones and Olken (2007).2 In our
case, the operational assumption is that successful and unsuccessful candidates are similar in terms
of proclivity towards trade and liberalization, diﬀering only by the experience of actually hosting
the Olympic games.
2Using this identiﬁcation strategy, we ﬁnd that countries that were unsuccessful candidates
for the games also experience a positive export eﬀect, one similar in size to that experienced by
actual Olympic hosts. These ﬁndings cast doubt on the idea that a plausible motivation for hosting
a mega-event is any change in a country’s fundamentals induced by holding the games (such as
construction activity or the resulting infrastructure). Instead, our evidence is consistent with the
conclusion that all countries that bid for the games experience an increase in outward orientation,
not just hosts. This raises two puzzles. Why should bidding for the Olympics be associated with
increased openness? And if hosting the games brings no tangible beneﬁts relative to a control group
of unsuccessful candidates, why would any country ever bid to hold an expensive mega-event?
We oﬀer an answer to these puzzles below. We explore the possibility that bidding to host
an international mega-event such as the Olympics is part of a costly strategy that signals trade
liberalization and results in increased openness. We develop a theoretical political-economy model
consistent with this conjecture. In the model, we obtain a separating equilibrium where bidding
to host a mega-event provides a positive signal about future policy intentions. However, consis-
tent with our empirical ﬁndings, hosting the games in and of itself has no impact on a nation’s
fundamentals or trade.
Our model also suggests an answer to the question “Why a mega-event?” as the choice of a
signal of liberalization intentions. We ﬁnd that countries will be more likely to use the Olympic
signal, the greater is the incidence of the expected cost of sending the signal on the group that
expects to beneﬁt from future liberalization. Major sporting events like the Olympics are tradition-
ally ﬁnanced by the relevant city (usually the capital) in conjunction with the central government
of the host country. Policy makers from these groups are likely to beneﬁt from liberalization. As
such, bidding for the Olympics may serve well as a signal because it aligns the costs and beneﬁts
of the signal. To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst model where the distributional implications of
sending the signal inﬂuence the desirability of the signal chosen. Olympic bids are also good signals
of liberalization because they are highly visible, infrequent, and have long lead times.
In the next section we brieﬂy review the relevant literatures on mega-events and signaling.
3Our empirical investigation of the Olympic eﬀect on trade begins in section 3; sensitivity analysis is
provided in the following section, and a comparison between successful and unsuccessful bids for the
Olympics follows. After some further robustness checks, we develop a theoretical model whereby
countries interested in signalling their future policy intention to liberalize do so by bidding for a
mega-event. The paper ends with a brief conclusion.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Literature on “mega events”
A number of studies exist that support local subsidization of sporting events; they often predict
large economic beneﬁts. This work is typically commissioned and is not intended for the academic
audience, but it is still inﬂuential. For example, Humphreys and Plummer (1995) estimate the
short-term economic impact to Atlanta from hosting the 1996 games to be $5.1 billion. Similarly
Fuller and Clinch (2000) estimate that the total economic impact of hosting the 2012 games on the
Washington-Baltimore metropolitan area would have been $5.3 billion.
More rigorous studies are skeptical of the net economic beneﬁts of hosting mega-events; see
e.g., Baade and Matheson (2002) and Owen (2005). The costs of holding such events seem con-
siderable. Further, any enduring beneﬁts derive mostly from infrastructure investments that the
host city could choose to make independently of the games. Much of the spending on the event
by local citizens is a substitute from a diﬀerent leisure activity or consumption good, rather than
true additional spending [e.g., Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) and Coates and Humphreys (2003)].
Moreover, the projects associated with the games typically seem to be white elephants, such as
poorly-used sporting facilities associated with idiosyncratic Olympic sports, or hotels and trans-
portation infrastructure built to accommodate a one-time peak demand of just three weeks.
Some have argued that hosting sporting events yields a non-pecuniary “feel good” beneﬁt to
local citizens who are ﬁlled with civic pride following a mega-event, even if they do not attend [e.g.
4Rappaport and Wilkerson (2001), Carlino and Coulson (2004), or Maennig and du Plessis (2007)].
However, the very existence of this intangible spillover is uncertain, let alone its magnitude. It seems
safe to say that a majority of the profession considers it unlikely that these beneﬁts justify the large
public expenditures involved in hosting such events [e.g. Coates, Humphreys, and Zimbalist (2006)
and Coates (2007)].
2.2 International Signaling Literature
The use of international signals to indicate future policy to prospective foreign investors has been
discussed in the literature. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) develop a model where governments with
asymmetric information about future ﬁscal positions signal their expectations through current
policies on capital account openness. Open capital accounts are more costly for countries in poor
ﬁscal condition, so those countries that expect to be in good ﬁscal condition in the future can signal
their prospects in ways that cannot be proﬁtably mimicked by countries that expect to face future
ﬁscal diﬃculties.
The signal we consider below is of a “burning money” type, not informative in its own sense,
but informative due to the fact that sending the signal is only attractive to the set of countries
that sincerely intend to pursue liberalization. In this sense, it is similar to the costs of delay in
a war of attrition model, such as that of the delayed ﬁscal stabilization in Alesina and Drazen
(1991). Other studies go even farther, e.g. Krugman (1998) and Mukand (2006), who argue that
countries sometimes pursue policies that are actually perverse in an eﬀort to increase investor
conﬁdence. Their argument is that in a globalized environment, policymakers may feel the need
to pursue policies that would conﬁrm foreign investors’ beliefs about what constitutes good policy.
These beliefs may be biased due to herding eﬀects [e.g. Banerjee (1992)], or alternatively because
investors may draw incorrect inferences about their impact. As a result, perverse policies may have
such an advantage in terms of their impact on agents’ expectations that pursuing them may be
superior than following the path that would yield the best outcome in terms of domestic economic
fundamentals.
5One question that naturally arises in these types of models is why one form of signal might be
preferred to another. We argue that one attribute of using the Olympics as a signal is the incidence
of the cost of sending the signal within the country. In particular, it is likely that the cost of
hosting the Olympics is primarily borne by the benefactors of the signaled policy change, limiting
the losses to those not favored by the policy. Mega-events like the Olympics are also infrequent,
highly visible, and have long lead times, attributes that lend themselves to signals of liberalization.
3 The Olympic Eﬀect on Trade
If the direct economic beneﬁts seem theoretically dubious, and any indirect eﬀects highly uncertain,
the willingness of local and federal governments to heavily subsidize sporting activities is a mystery.
We now try to tackle this issue empirically. In particular, we take seriously the argument that
hosting a mega-event provides visibility to a host country and thus may stimulate global demand
for its exports.
3.1 Speciﬁcation and Data
We start our investigation by using the well-known and widely employed “gravity” model of in-
ternational trade.3 This models bilateral trade ﬂows between a pair of countries as a function of
the distance between the two countries and their economic “masses.” We augment this empirical
speciﬁcation by adding a host of other factors that might also aﬀect their trade intensity. We
employ the following speciﬁcation:
6ln(Xijt) = β0 + β1ln(Dij) + β2ln(Popit) + β3ln(Popjt) + β4ln(GDPpcit) + β5ln(GDPpcjt)
+ β6Contijt + β7CUijt + β8Langij + β9RTAijt + β10Borderij + β11Islandsij
+ β12Areaij + β13ComColij + β14Colonyijt + β15EverColij + β16SameCtryijt
+ γOOlympicsit + γSSummerit + γWWinterit + εijt.
(1)
where i denotes the exporting country, j denotes the importer, t denotes time, ln(·) denotes the
natural logarithm operator, and the variables are deﬁned as:
• Xijt denotes real FOB exports from i to j, measured in millions of dollars,
• D is the distance between i and j,
• Pop is population,
• GDPpc is annual real GDP per capita,
• Cont is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border and zero otherwise,
• CU is a binary “dummy” variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t ,
• Lang is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a common language,
• RTA is a binary variable which is unity if i and j have a regional trade agreement at t,
• Border is a binary variable which is unity if i and j share a land border,
• Islands is the number of island countries in the pair (0/1/2),
• Area is the log of the product of the areas of the countries,
• ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were both colonized by the same country,
7• Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i colonizes j at time t (or vice versa),
• EverCol is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j (or vice versa),
• SameCtry is a binary variable which is unity if i is part of the same country at time t (or
vice versa),
• β is a vector of nuisance coeﬃcients,
• Olympics/Summer/Winter are binary variables which are unity if i hosted a post-war
Olympics games/Summer games/Winter games at or before time t, and zero otherwise,
• ε represents the omitted other inﬂuences on bilateral exports, assumed to be well behaved.
The sources of our bilateral data set are described in more detail in Appendix Table A1.
This data set includes annual observations between 1950 and 2006 (though with many missing
observations) for some 196 territories and localities (we refer to these as “countries” below). The
countries themselves are tabulated in Table A2.
We estimate this equation with OLS, using a robust covariance estimator (clustered by country-
pair dyads) to handle heteroskedasticity, adding year-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. We also perturb this
speciﬁcation in two important ways. First, we add a comprehensive set of dyadic-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects (i.e., a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of {βij} intercepts) to absorb any time-
invariant characteristics that are common to a pair of countries. Second, we add comprehensive
sets of exporter and importer ﬁxed eﬀects (i.e., sets of {βi} and {βj}) to take account of any time-
invariant country-speciﬁc factors. We also show below that our key results are insensitive to the
use of other estimation strategies.4
We are interested in the {γ} coeﬃcients. These represent the permanent export eﬀect associ-
ated with having hosted the post-war Olympic games, holding other export determinants constant
through the gravity model (we try hard not to interpret these coeﬃcients as causal). We estimate
these “Olympic eﬀects” in two diﬀerent ways, either estimating the eﬀects of the Summer and Win-
ter games separately (in which case we set γO = 0) or estimating a single common eﬀect of hosting
8either type of games (in this case, we impose γS = γW = 0). The hosts of post-war Olympics games
are tabulated in Appendix Table A3.
3.2 Benchmark Results
The results of estimating our default speciﬁcation are presented in Table 1. There are six diﬀerent
columns; the equation is estimated with three diﬀerent sets of ﬁxed eﬀects (none, dyadic, and
exporter/importer) for two diﬀerent sets of Olympic dummy variables (separate and combined
Summer/Winter eﬀects).
Before we discuss the coeﬃcients of greatest interest to us, we brieﬂy discuss the other de-
terminants of trade ﬂows. The gravity model seems to work well. It delivers precisely estimated
coeﬃcients that are sensible and similar to those estimated by others. For instance, β1 is consis-
tently estimated to be economically and statistically signiﬁcant; exports between a pair of countries
fall with distance (as previous researchers have found). Similarly, the size and signiﬁcance of β3 and
β5 indicates that larger and richer countries both tend to import more. Exports are larger when
countries share a money, language, trade agreement, land border, or colonial heritage. Further, the
equations ﬁt the (largely cross-sectional) data set well, explaining well over half of the variation in
exports. While these results are not of direct interest to us, they do reassure us that our estimates
are grounded in a statistical conditioning model that delivers sensible and signiﬁcant results.
Once the standard trade determinants are accounted for by the gravity model, is there any
room left for a permanent export eﬀect of hosting the Olympics? Somewhat surprisingly (at least
initially to us), the answer is unambiguously positive. Consider the column on the extreme left-hand
side of Table 1, which estimates separate export eﬀects for having hosted either the Summer or the
Winter Olympics games. Both estimates are positive and statistically distinguishable from zero at
all reasonable signiﬁcance levels.5 Further, the “Olympic Eﬀect” is economically large. Consider
the point estimate of γS, which is .31. Taken literally, this implies that countries that have hosted
the summer games have exports that are permanently higher by some [exp(.31)−1] = 36%! This is
9big, broadly comparable in our estimates to, e.g., the eﬀects of a shared regional trade agreement. It
is also similar to the eﬀect of hosting either the Summer or Winter games. Reassuringly, including
either dyadic or country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects does not change the key results very much. The
eﬀects associated with hosting the (summer or either) games is around .3, both statistically and
economically diﬀerent from zero.6
We do not estimate strong export eﬀects of hosting the winter games; the coeﬃcients are
typically small and usually insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (especially for the more reliable results
that include ﬁxed eﬀects). We do not ﬁnd this particularly surprising; the scale of the winter
Games has always been dwarfed by those of the summer games, and the geographic requirements
of the winter games place more constraints on potential hosts. With a few exceptions, the winter
games have tended to be held in relatively small towns, often those considered to be winter resorts
(especially early on).7 As a result, there is considerable heterogeneity in the Olympic eﬀect.8
It should also be mentioned in passing that any export eﬀect associated with the Olympic games
seems to be permanent rather than transitory. In Appendix Table A4, we present an analogue
to Table 1, but one where the three key binary variables (Olympics, Summer, and Winter) are
redeﬁned to be unity only in the year of the actual games, and zero otherwise. In this case, we
ﬁnd no strong consistent patterns for the three coeﬃcients of interest; γO is never signiﬁcant, while
both γS and γW are signiﬁcant in one each of the remaining estimates. Both of the latter results
are economically small and neither is robust to the exact choice of ﬁxed eﬀects.9
4 Sensitivity Analysis
4.1 Robustness of Permanent Eﬀect
Are the (surprisingly) strong linkages between exports and Olympic hosts fragile? Or instead,
do small perturbations to the exact sample or choice of conditioning model have a strong eﬀect
on the results? No. We provide a battery of robustness checks in Table 2, which is intended to
10reassure the skeptical reader that our results are essentially insensitive to minor changes in the
exact econometric methodology used to estimate {γ}. Each of the rows in the table corresponds to
a diﬀerent sensitivity check, while the six columns correspond exactly to those of Table 1. We only
report estimates for the coeﬃcients of interest {γ}; other controls are included in the regressions
as appropriate but not reported.10
The ﬁrst experiment of Table 2 shows the results when exports from i to j are replaced by
imports into i from j. The coeﬃcients remain statistically large and positive. Indeed, the point
estimates are, if anything, somewhat larger than those associated with exports. This indicates that
the Olympics are associated with an increase in the openness of an Olympic host. The Games do
not seem to act as simple export promotion, but are instead associated with an increase in two-way
trade between the host and the rest of the world.
Next we change the empirical model in two ways. First, we include country-speciﬁc linear time-
trend terms in place of country-speciﬁc intercepts. Secondly, we strip down the gravity model by
including only bilateral distance, importer population, and importer income as controls.11 However,
our key ﬁnding of strong positive γS and γO coeﬃcients seems to persist. The same is true when
we add regional dummy variables.12
Do our results depend sensitively on a small set of observations that might come from a special
set of observations? We check by selectively dropping diﬀerent sets of observations. Since we are
interested in exporter eﬀects and only a small number of countries have hosted the Olympics post-
war, we begin by dropping diﬀerent sets of importer observations.13 We ﬁrst drop all observations
for importers that are industrial. We then successively delete observations for developing countries
from: Latin America or the Caribbean; Africa; Asia; or the Middle East.14 We then successively
drop small exporters (deﬁning a small country as one with fewer than a million people), small
importers (those with real GDP per capita of less than $1000 per annum), poor importers, and the
intersection of these four sets. None of these robustness checks shakes the conﬁdence we have in
our basic results. We then check the sensitivity of our results with respect to time. We separately
drop late (post-2000) and early (pre-1960) observations; again this does not destroy our ﬁndings.
11We ﬁnish up this analysis with ﬁve further experiments. First, we drop outlier observations,
deﬁned as those where the residual is far (more than 2.5 standard deviations) away from zero.
Second, we weight our regressions by the log of the product of the country-pair real GDP. We then
redeﬁne our key Olympics regressor in two ways. First, we construct a variable which is 0 if neither
i nor j has hosted the Olympics at or before time t, 1 if either i or j has hosted (at or before t),
and 2 if both i and j have hosted. Second, we construct a dummy which is 0 if neither i nor j has
hosted the Olympics at or before time t, and 1 if either i or j has hosted (at or before t). The last
variable delivers insigniﬁcant results for hosting the summer games when ﬁxed eﬀects are included;
otherwise, our results are insensitive. Finally, we use the Glick-Taylor historical data set, which
includes bilateral trade (but not export) data stretching back to 1870. Using this long data set
allows us to incorporate observations for countries that have hosted the games at any point during
the modern Olympiad era, not just from the shorter postwar period. However, our ﬁndings remain
resilient; countries seem to have permanently higher trade ﬂows after having hosted the games.
We conclude that our results do not seem to result from some small subset of the data set, and
are relatively robust to reasonable changes in the sample and exact speciﬁcation of our empirical
model. Countries that have hosted the Olympic games (especially the summer games) seem to have
higher trade than others.
4.2 Endogeneity
A question arises immediately: Can the choice of venue for the Olympic games be treated as
plausibly exogenous? Perhaps only countries that are open to trade are chosen to host the games?
We attempt to address this point more directly below with a treatment methodology that matches
Olympic hosts to other countries. Still, we now make several points.
First, the endogeneity critique (along with much of our analysis) is primarily cross-sectional,
while the empirical ﬁnding is found in the time-series behavior of trade.
Second, our analysis shows that countries become more open after the Olympics. However,
12cities (not countries) bid to host the games. Indeed, four American cities vied for the 1948 Olympics
(which went to London); ﬁve American cities applied in 1952 (again without success), and six in
1956 (also unsuccessfully).15
Third, the IOC provides details both on how it awards the games and why a city should be
interested. There is a long list of technical criteria which are evaluated by an IOC committee; few
of these criteria are closely associated with trade.16 Informally, there is also geographic balancing,
and the IOC seems to award perseverance (a number of cities have applied repeatedly). We also
note in passing that there is considerable randomness inherent in the process.17
Fourth, our data does allow us to consider the issue of reverse causality directly. In particular,
we can statistically examine whether more open countries are more likely to bid for, or obtain
hosting rights to the Olympics. We conduct probit tests to that eﬀect in Table A5 in the appendix.
In addition to including openness, we control for country size and per capita income. We ﬁnd that
openness enters insigniﬁcantly throughout, suggesting that reverse causality is not an issue.18
Why does the IOC think that cities should be interested in hosting the Olympics? They state:
“Apart from the sporting events, the main reason for applying for candidacy lies in the
possibilities for economic development and tourism inherent in such an event. For this
reason, and also given the high infrastructure costs, only rich countries have the means
to make a good return on such a large investment.”19
“Two main reasons seem to motivate most applicant cities, namely international recog-
nition and increased opportunities for invigorated urban and regional development.
Indeed, the host city hopes to take advantage of the event to maximize its facilities
due to the considerable income generated by the Games, and to give itself an enhanced
image to attract future visitors, consumers and potential investors ... Organising the
Olympic Games is a fantastic advertising opportunity for the host city... Moreover, or-
ganising the Olympic Games is an opportunity for the host city and country to show the
world their ability to undertake and organise successfully such an important event. This
promotional aspect is often motivated by the politicians of the host country, thereby
explaining the heavy involvement of national governments in the organisation and ﬁ-
nancing of Olympic Games”20
134.3 Other International “Mega-events”
While the Olympics are highly visible, they are not the only mega-event. Do other events deliver
similar results? One obvious alternative to consider is the World Cup, the only serious competitor
with the Olympics for title of most important international sporting event.
Like the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup is held every four years. It began in 1930 in much
the small-scale way as did the modern Olympics game, with thirteen (mostly Latin American)
countries participating in a tournament held in Uruguay. The 1934 and 1938 tournaments were
also relatively small and regional, being held in Europe with limited participation by the Latins.
The event only really took oﬀ in 1950 (the 1942 and 1946 events were canceled for World War
II). This was due in part to a new convention of alternating the event between the Americas and
Europe.21 We construct dummy variables for countries that have hosted the World Cup post-war
in a manner analogous to those for the Olympic games, and add them to our speciﬁcation. We
report our results in Table 3a.
The results of Table 3a are intriguing. The eﬀect of hosting the Olympics games remains
positive and statistically signiﬁcant for all six of the speciﬁcations we estimate; the coeﬃcients
continue to average around .3. The eﬀects of hosting the FIFA World cup are similar in sign, size,
and statistical precision. Indeed, we can never reject the hypothesis of equal trade eﬀects of hosting
the Olympics and the World Cup.
What about international events that do not involve sports? After all, international expo-
sitions and world’s fairs have a much older pedigree than the modern Olympics, stretching back
at least to the 1851 Great Exhibition in London’s Crystal Palace.22 The decline of international
communication and transportation costs has largely made world’s fairs obsolete, and they have
declined in importance and number throughout the post-war period (though Expo 67 in Montreal
is widely considered to be the most successful expo ever held). Still, Table 3b adds comparably
constructed binary variables for (twenty) post-war expos and world’s fairs to our default speciﬁ-
cation. In all six speciﬁcations, the trade eﬀect of hosting a world’s fair or expo is positive and
14statistically signiﬁcant, though it is smaller than the Olympic eﬀect on trade.
There seem to be a number of ways in which a country can enhance its trade by hosting an
international mega-event. The trade-expanding eﬀects of hosting an event like the Olympics seem
to be large, and they are broadly comparable to those associated with hosting the FIFA World
Cup. Holding an expo or world’s fair also seems to have much the same eﬀect. Given our initial
doubts concerning the beneﬁts of hosting a mega-event, we now dive into the issue more deeply.
5 Unsuccessful Candidates
It is diﬃcult for us to believe that hosting the Olympics actually has such a large eﬀect on trade,
let alone one that enhances trade permanently. Yet our sensitivity analysis shows that our results
are sturdy.
We now take a skeptical look at our results from a diﬀerent angle. To estimate the eﬀects
of the Olympics on trade in the previous section, our statistical model compared hosts with non-
hosts. This seems a reasonable strategy, since not all countries have hosted the games (so there is
cross-sectional variation), and the countries that host the Olympics do so at diﬀerent points of time
(so there is time-series variation). However, it may be that our regression results are implicitly
comparing apples with oranges; countries are not randomly chosen to host the Olympics. One way
to get at this issue is to compare the trade patterns of host countries with those that bid unsuc-
cessfully for the games. We refer to the latter as “candidate” countries; candidates are tabulated in
Appendix Table A3.23 Our implicit assumption in comparing the trade eﬀects of Olympic hosting
and candidacy is that failed candidacies form a valid quasi-experimental counterfactual control
group for Olympic hosts (after the inclusion of other conditioning variables).24
In Table 4, we report results when we add a set of binary variables for countries that were
unsuccessful candidates to host the Olympics. These have been constructed in the same way as our
host dummy variables. For instance, London was awarded the 1948 summer games, so the summer
host variable is unity for all British (export) observations from 1948 through the end of the sample.
15Since Lausanne was an unsuccessful candidate for the 1948 games, all Swiss observations from 1948
also take the value of unity for the comparable summer candidate variable. We tabulate separate
export estimates for: a) being an unsuccessful Olympic candidate; and b) actually hosting the
games. Intriguingly, all the eﬀects - that is, both the host and the candidate coeﬃcients - are
signiﬁcantly positive. Indeed, as the tests shown at the bottom of the panel show, they are also
typically similar in size; the hypothesis that host and candidate eﬀects are equal cannot be rejected
for four of the six estimates. In one of the other cases (no ﬁxed eﬀects, combining the summer
and winter Olympic eﬀects) the host eﬀect is bigger than the candidate eﬀect; in another (country-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, separating summer and winter eﬀects), the candidate eﬀect is marginally larger
than the host eﬀect.25
This is an intriguing result, one which we ﬁnd reasonably consistently throughout our investi-
gation. It implies that the (sizeable) eﬀect on trade seems to come not from actually hosting the
games but from being a country that bids for them. More generally, signaling that the country is
capable and willing to host the Olympics through a highly visible international bid for a mega-event
seems to be associated with a sizeable trade-expanding eﬀect on trade. Indeed, the eﬀect of sending
this signal seems broadly comparable in size to actually hosting the games. This is consistent with
our view that any direct trade eﬀect of hosting the games is small.26 Moreover, it suggests that the
observed eﬀects of hosting a mega-event do not seem to stem from a “big push” type of process
[e.g. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989)].
6 Further Robustness Checks
In this section, we brieﬂy subject our results to three further sensitivity tests. Given our interest
in estimating and comparing the eﬀects of both hosting and bidding for a mega-event like the
Olympics, we have three particular concerns; a) econometric issues associated with the gravity
model; b) econometric issues associated with selection bias and endogeneity; and c) the presence
of our ﬁnding in multilateral data.
166.1 Tetradic estimates
We begin by dealing with the problem that gravity models like ours may be mis-speciﬁced because
of “monadic” problems. These refer to omitted factors that are speciﬁc to a single country but may
vary over time, such as those associated with “multilateral resistance” to trade [e.g. Anderson and
Van Wincoop (2003)].
To deal with the problem, we adopt the “method of tetrads” advocated by Head, Mayer, and
Ries (2008). Under this method, consistent estimators of the coeﬃcients of interest can be attained
in the presence of multilateral resistance by comparing export observations to exports for a pair of
base countries for the same year (the technique is tetradic since one compares trade ﬂows for four
countries). This method avoids the large number of coeﬃcient estimates that would be required to
estimate the monadic eﬀects using a more conventional ﬁxed eﬀects method, but does not entail
non-linear estimation; Head, Mayer, and Ries (2008) provide more details.27
One issue that arises in tetradic gravity speciﬁcations is the designation of the base countries.
To ensure that our results are robust, we use three diﬀerent pairs of base countries: a) the United
States and the United Kingdom; b) Japan and France; and c) Germany and Canada. A second
issue is that the error terms in our tetrads are likely to be correlated, as error terms for individ-
ual countries appear repeatedly across observations. We therefore use the methodology of Head,
Mayer, and Ries (2008) to correct our standard error estimates. Finally, this estimation technique
requires variation across both dyads and time, so that the dummy variable we used for Table 1 is
inadmissible; we substitute instead a dummy which is 0 if neither i nor j has bid for the Olympics
at or before time t, and 1 if either i or j has.
Our results are reported in Table 5. It can be seen that we continue to obtain positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of either hosting or candidacy for the Olympics, regardless of our
choice of base countries. Our point estimates for the combined Winter/Summer Games are close
to those of Tables 1-4, though our point estimate for the summer games alone is implausibly large.
176.2 Treatment methodology
We next use a treatment methodology, comparing exports for either hosts or candidate countries
with exports for matched counterparts. This allows us to better handle the problem that candidate
and host countries for the Olympic games are not randomly selected from our sample. We match
observations using a stratiﬁcation technique. Our variables used for matching country-pair*year ob-
servations include the logs of: distance, exporter and importer populations, exporter and importer
real GDPs per capita; and dummy variables for sharing a common language or border.
We do two kinds of matching: a) we match actual Olympic host countries to candidates; and
b) we match non-candidates to the union of hosts and candidates. If host and candidate countries
experience similar trade boosts, we expect the ﬁrst exercise to lead to small diﬀerences in exports.
If bidding for a mega-event is key, we expect the second exercise to result in large trade eﬀects.
Our results, along with bootstrapped standard error estimates are shown in Table 6. We
ﬁnd that hosts of the Summer Olympics experience a small increase in exports compared with
candidates for the games. This eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant at a 5% (but not 1%) conﬁdence
level. However, if one compares hosts and candidates for either the summer or winter games,
this eﬀect becomes statistically insigniﬁcant and remains economically small. These weak results
are in stark contrast to those which compare hosts and candidates to non-candidate countries.
Whether one considers the summer games alone or the combined games, hosts and candidates
jointly experience a considerable trade boost compared with non-candidates. These eﬀects are
economically large (exports rise by about 20%) and are signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
6.3 Multilateral data
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we examine the eﬀect of hosting or being a candidate for the Olympics
on the aggregate export/GDP ratio; we also consider being a World Cup host. We do this by
simply regressing multilateral data (so that an observation is for a particular country and year) on
the Olympic dummies.28
18Our results are shown in Table 7. We ﬁnd that countries which have hosted the Olympics have
trade approximately 15% (=exp(.14)-1) higher, other things be equal. We obtain qualitatively sim-
ilar positive coeﬃcients for candidacy, but our large estimated standard errors preclude statistically
signiﬁcant results at standard conﬁdence levels. Still, our results with aggregate data mirror those
above in the sense that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coeﬃcient estimates on hosting
and candidacy are positive and equivalent. Finally, we also obtain similar positive and statistically
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates for having hosted the World Cup in all of our reported regressions.
7 A Signaling Model
7.1 Setup
Our results suggest that the Olympic eﬀect on trade in the data is not associated with hosting the
games but rather from bidding for them; bidding to host the games seems to send a signal that has
a sizeable trade-expanding eﬀect. In this section, we develop a political-economy signaling model
consistent with this result. Our model is of the “burning money” type. In keeping with our empirical
results, we assume that countries that intend to pursue liberal trade policies in the future can signal
this intent by engaging in the costly activity of bidding to host the Olympic Games. The payoﬀ for
sending this signal is that countries which expect to liberalize receive increased investment in the
export sector (the sector whose prices are raised by liberalization). Under appropriate parameter
conditions, we obtain a separating equilibrium where countries that choose to liberalize also choose
to bid for the Olympics; those that prefer to remain closed neither send the signal nor do they
liberalize. We close with some discussion about why oﬀering to host a mega-event might serve as
a desirable signal.29
To allow trade liberalization to have distributional consequences, we introduce a two-sector
speciﬁc factors model of a small open economy in which liberalization increases prices in the export
sector and lowers them in the import-competing sector. National governments diﬀer in the degree to
which they value gains to the exporting sector, and we assume that they cannot credibly reveal these
19valuations to potential investors. The government in each country makes a discrete liberalization
and signaling decision based on its expectations concerning the impact of liberalization on its utility.
Both sectors of the economy produce using a ﬁxed domestic factor, which can be considered
sector-speciﬁc capital. Putty capital, k, is mobile across sectors and earns an international market
rate of return, which is ﬁxed at r∗.30 Real output levels in the export and import-competing sectors
satisfy yj(k), where y′
j > 0 and y′′
j < 0, j = x,m. For simplicity, we assume that all putty capital
is imported by domestic entrepreneurs, who have claims on the ﬁxed factors and earn any residual
proﬁts from operations.
As the country is small, it takes world prices as given. However, domestic prices are a function
of the government’s liberalization decision. Liberalization raises prices in the export sector and
lowers them in the import-competing sector. Prices while the nation is closed to external markets
are denoted px
c and pm
c, while after opening they are px
o and pm






The timing of the model is as follows: First, the government decides whether or not to submit
a bid to host the Olympics. Next, the private agents make their investment decisions, based on
their expectations of the government’s liberalization decision. Finally, the government makes its
liberalization decision, the winning Olympics host is named, and the payoﬀs are determined.
To ensure sub-game perfection, we solve the model backwards. Subsequent to receiving the
government’s signal, foreign putty capital is invested in each sector to equate the value of marginal





l) = (1 + r∗); j = x,m, l = c,o. (2)
where k∗
j
l; j = x,m, l = c,o represents the equilibrium amount of putty capital allocated to sector
j, i.e. the value satisfying equation (2). Since dk∗










20Given that the government’s liberalization decision conﬁrms investor expectations, the return
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cym(σ) − (1 + r∗)σ]dσ < 0. (5)
Let c represent the cost of hosting the Olympics, net of any non-pecuniary beneﬁt of hosting
the games, such as national pride. Let π represent the probability that a candidate will be awarded
the right to host the games conditional on having sent the signal.31
We assume that the reputation cost of being awarded the games and backing out is prohibitive.
Bidding for the Olympics and not hosting them would be highly embarrassing and would adversely
impact a nation’s international reputation. These are infrequent, highly visible events with long lead
times, features which make them attractive as signals of liberalization.32 Given this assumption,
each nation expects to host the games conditional on being awarded them. The expected cost of
sending the signal is therefore equal to πc. The government ﬁnances the cost of sending the signal
by imposing a lump-sum tax on each sector, where the export sector pays a share γ of the cost of
sending the signal, γπc, and the import-competing sector pays the rest, (1 − γ)πc.
The government is assumed to have a utility function that is concave in earnings from each




θju(vj); j = x,m. (6)
where u′ ≥ 0,u′′ ≤ 0.33 For simplicity, we normalize by setting θm = 1, and deﬁne θ ≡ θx as
the measure of the degree to which government utility favors the export sector over the import-
competing sector. However, we assume there is a continuum of heterogeneous countries z ∈ [z,z]
that diﬀer in the relative values their governments place on local earnings from these sectors (below,
we formally specify that a higher z indicates that the government values export earnings more than
those of importers). We assume that θz, the value of θ held by the government of country z, is
symmetrically distributed on the interval [θ,θ] with mean value 1. For notational simplicity, we
drop the z superscripts unless we are comparing decisions across countries.




Similarly, let ˆ Ug represent the government’s utility after it sends a credible signal and liberalizes.
ˆ Ug satisﬁes
ˆ Ug = θu(vx
o − γπc) + u(vm
o − (1 − γ)πc). (8)
7.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of signal and liberalization decisions by each government that maximizes
its expected utility, along with a set of investment decisions in the two sectors consistent with
maximizing the returns to the domestic entrepreneurs, conditional on the signal of the government.
We ﬁrst rule out two oﬀ-equilibrium path outcomes, where the signal sent by the government
fails to match its subsequent liberalization decision. We ﬁrst examine the condition that ensures
22that the government always liberalizes following a bid for the games. Deﬁne ˆ Uc
g as expected gov-
ernment utility subsequent to sending a credible signal and failing to liberalize. ˆ Uc
g satisﬁes
ˆ Uc
g = θu(˜ vc
x − γπc) + u(˜ vc




j );j = e,m. This is the value of revenues in sector j consistent with signaling
liberalization and then not liberalizing, i.e. the revenue level conditional on capital consistent with
liberalization but prices consistent with remaining closed.34
Second, we need to ensure that conditional on not sending the signal, the government does not
choose to liberalize. Deﬁne Uo
g as the payoﬀ to the government that liberalizes after not sending
sending a signal; Uo
g satisﬁes
Uo
g = θu(˜ vo





j );j = x,m, i.e. the value of revenues in sector j consistent with not signaling
liberalization and then liberalizing. This will be equal to the revenue level with capital stock levels
consistent with remaining closed but prices consistent with liberalization.
Our analysis is aided by a lemma:
Lemma 1 Given the signal decision, the change in government utility with liberalization is mono-
tonically increasing in θ.
Proof: Found in Appendix A.6.
By Lemma 1 and equations (8) and (9), ˆ Ug ≥ ˆ Uc
g if and only if
θ ≥
u(˜ vc
m − (1 − γ)πc) − u(vm
o − (1 − γ)πc)
u(vx
o − γπc) − u(˜ vc
x − γπc)
(11)
Similarly, by Lemma 1 and equations (7) and (10), Ug > Uo
g if and only if
23θ <
u(vm






If both conditions are satisﬁed, the government will liberalize after submitting a bid to host the
Olympics; it will not liberalize without sending this signal. We can therefore rule out oﬀ-equilibrium
path behavior among all countries if (11) and (12) are satisﬁed.
Next we extend our analysis to decisions across a set of heterogeneous countries. We number the
countries such that θz ≤ θz+1. Deﬁne θ∗ as the value of θz which leaves the government indiﬀerent
between staying closed and not sending the signal, and sending the signal and liberalizing. By




o − (1 − γ)πc)
u(vx
o − γπc) − u(vx
c)
(13)
We ﬁrst verify that conditions (11) and (12) are satisﬁed for θ∗. By (13) and (11), a suﬃcient
(but not necessary) condition for θ∗ to satisfy (11) is
vx
c ≥ ˜ vc
x − γπc. (14)
Intuitively, this restriction requires that the earnings of the export sector without liberalization
are higher when the government does not send the costly signal. Similarly, a suﬃcient (but not
necessary) condition for θ∗ to satisfy (11) is
vo
x − γπc ≥ ˜ vo
x. (15)
Similarly, this restriction requires that the earnings of the export sector with liberalization
are higher when the government sends the (costly) signal. Combined, these restrictions imply that
revenues in the export sector are lower under both oﬀ-equilibrium path strategies.
24We adopt these restrictions below (which we reiterate are suﬃcient but not necessary). This
leads to our ﬁrst proposition:
Proposition 1 There exists a separating equilibrium where countries with θz ≥ θ∗ send the signal
and liberalize, and countries with θz < θ∗ neither send the signal nor liberalize.
Proof: First, consider the set of countries with θz < θ∗. Since the gains from liberalizing are
monotonic in θ by Lemma 1 and we have ruled out oﬀ-equilibrium path strategies, these countries’
governments would prefer to not send the signal. Similarly, the countries with governments holding
values of θz that satisfy θz ≥ θ∗ would choose to send the signal and liberalize. We therefore obtain
the separating equilibrium described in the proposition.
7.3 Incidence of Signaling Cost
It can be seen in equation (8) that the desirability of sending the signal and liberalizing is a
function of γ, the share of the cost of sending the signal that is borne by the export sector. Since
liberalization beneﬁts the export sector and harms the import-competing sector, it seems plausible
that the government’s preference for liberalizing is increasing in γ, as it mitigates the disadvantages
from liberalization to the import-competing sector. However, this must be balanced against the
government’s preference for revenues from the export sector, parameterized by θ. If the government
favors the export sector too heavily, this could outweigh the equilibrating impact of an increase in
γ in its utility function, and the desire for liberalization would be decreasing in γ.
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c)
. (16)
The denominator is positive, so the sign of the derivative is equal to the sign of the bracketed
term in the numerator. There are three terms here: θ∗; the marginal utility of the export sector
after liberalization; and the marginal utility of the import sector after liberalization. The entire
25term will be negative if and only if
θ∗ ≤
u′[vm




Condition (17) requires that θ∗ (the relative valuation of export earnings held by the gov-
ernment that is just indiﬀerent between liberalizing and not liberalizing) is less than or equal to
the marginal rate of substitution between post-liberalization earnings in the import-competing and
export sectors. Intuitively, this restriction implies that post-liberalization earnings in the import-
competing sector are suﬃciently low relative to those in the export sector, even after adjusting
for the relative weight placed on export earnings (θ∗). For example, in the benchmark case where
the government values earnings in each sector equally (θ∗ = 1), the condition will be satisﬁed if
earnings in the export sector subsequent to liberalization, net of its share of the expected cost of
bidding for the games, are less than or equal to those in the import sector, net of their share of the
expected signaling costs.
Given this condition, we obtain our second proposition:
Proposition 2 Given a separating equilibrium for all countries z ∈ [z,z], and satisfaction of
condition (17), an increase in γ reduces θ∗, raising the set of countries that choose to send the
signal and liberalize, while if (17) is violated, an increase in γ increases θ∗.
The proof follows directly from equations (16) and (17). The intuition behind Proposition
2 lies in the fact that increases in γ improve the alignment between the costs and beneﬁts from
liberalization. If the marginal country’s government does not favor the export sector too heavily, an
increase in γ (the exporters’ share of the burden of sending the signal) raises the share of countries
choosing to send the signal and liberalize, since the expected losses to the import-competing sector
are reduced.
This may favor the use of bidding for the olympics as a signal of openness intentions. The costs
of hosting the Games are traditionally borne by the host city (usually the capital) in conjunction
26with the central government of the host country. Policy makers from these groups are likely to
beneﬁt from liberalization. In terms of our model, “mega-events” like the Olympics may be high γ
signals.
To summarize: our model suggests that countries choose to bid for a mega-event in order to
signal investors about their future liberalization intentions. Under certain parameter conditions,
governments that wish to liberalize can proﬁt from sending the costly signal of bidding to host the
games, while those that do not wish to liberalize do not; a separating equilibrium.
Our model shows that the conditions imply that the probability-weighted cost of holding the
Olympics must be suﬃciently large to dissuade governments that do not wish to liberalize from
sending a false signal. This motivates the choice of a costly mega-event as a signal of liberalization
intentions.
Further, the model also demonstrates that distributional implications matter; the incidence
of the cost of the signal has an impact on its desirability. The signal must be suﬃciently costly
to the export sector, the sector that would beneﬁt from the policy change, not just costly to the
nation. Also, if the government does not favor the export sector too greatly, and liberalization has
suﬃcient distributional consequences, an increase in share of expected cost of hosting games borne
by the export sector increases the marginal government’s willingness to bid. That is, the higher
is the expected burden of hosting the Olympics on the exportable sector, the more attractive is a
mega-event as a signal of liberalization.
8 Conclusion
In July 2001, Beijing was awarded the right to host the Games of the XXIX Olympiad. Just two
months later, China successfully concluded negotiations with the World Trade Organization, thus
formalizing its commitment to trade liberalization. Nor is this a once-oﬀ coincidence. Rome was
awarded the 1960 games in 1955, the same year Italy started to move towards currency convertibility,
joined the UN, and, most importantly, began the Messina negotiations that lead two years later
27to the Treaty of Rome and the creation of the European Economic Community. The Tokyo games
of 1964 coincided with Japanese entry into the IMF and the OECD. Barcelona was awarded the
1992 games in 1986, the same year Spain joined the EEC; the decision to award Korea the 1988
games coincided with Korea’s political liberalization. The correlation extends beyond the Olympics;
the 1986 World Cup was held in Mexico coincident with its trade liberalization and entry into
the GATT.35 In this paper, we model this linkage between mega-events and liberalization both
theoretically and empirically.
The motivation for hosting a mega-event like the Olympics seems elusive to economists. Plau-
sibly measured net economic beneﬁts are rarely large and typically negative; claims of non-economic
beneﬁts are diﬃcult to verify. Yet in practice countries compete ﬁercely for the right to host such
events. Why? This paper identiﬁes one potential explanation; countries that host the games enjoy
a substantive permanent increase in trade – the “Olympic Eﬀect.” Similar increases in openness
are observed for countries that host other mega-events, such as the World Cup and, until recently,
World’s Fairs. For a country pursuing a trade-oriented development strategy, such an outcome
would clearly be attractive.
Our empirical results show that the Olympic eﬀect is robust; hosting the games tends to
increase a country’s openness substantively and permanently. But while hosting the games is
suﬃcient to boost trade, it is not necessary. In practice, we ﬁnd that countries that bid for the
Olympics unsuccessfully also experience a boost in trade, comparable to that received by actual
Olympic hosts. This ﬁnding implies that the Olympic Eﬀect on trade does not stem from a change
in economic fundamentals (which might be associated with a “big push” type of process), caused
by the activity or infrastructure associated with hosting the Olympics. Instead, our empirical
ﬁndings suggest that bidding for the Olympics is a costly policy signal that is followed by future
liberalization. We explore this conjecture in a political economy model, where governments choose
whether or not to signal future liberalization by hosting the Olympics. We derive the conditions for
a separating equilibrium, where only countries that value liberalization choose to send the signal
and liberalize. Our model also suggests that the size and distributional consequences of this type
28of signal may inﬂuence its desirability.
We close with a number of cautions. First, our model makes no clear statement on the merit
of public support for hosting mega-events. Second, there are other motivations for hosting mega-
events which we have not modeled; for instance, our theory cannot easily explain the behavior of
countries that submit repeated or multiple bids for large sporting events. Finally, other signals of
and routes to liberalization exist, and our analysis does not examine the relative eﬀectiveness of
these paths; we leave such issues to future research.
29Table 1: Permanent Eﬀect of Olympics on Exports in Gravity Model
Fixed Eﬀects: None None Dyadic Dyadic Exporter, Importer Exporter, Importer
Summer .31** .25** .31**
(.04) (.03) (.04)
Winter .14** -.07 -.06
(.04) (.04) (.05)
Olympics, Either .33** .30** .38**
(.03) (.03) (.04)
Log Distance -1.11** -1.11** -1.33** -1.33**
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
Log Exp Population 1.06** 1.07** .18** .20** -.25** -.23**
(.01) (.01) (.06) (.06) (.06) (.06)
Log Imp Population .88** .89** .80** .79** .45** .44**
(.01) (.01) (.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Log Exp Real GDP p/c 1.54** 1.54** 1.24** 1.23** 1.25** 1.25**
(.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Log Imp Real GDP p/c 1.18** 1.18** .87** .87** .84** .84**
(.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Currency Union 1.02** 1.02** .56** .55** .67** .67**
(.10) (.10) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.10)
Common Language .45** .46** .35** .34**
(.04) (.04) (.03) (.03)
RTA .28** .27** .29** .29** .43** .43**
(.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.03)
Common Border .68** .69** .46** .46**
(.08) (.08) (.08) (.08)
No. Islands .17** .18** 1.92** -3.81**
(.03) (.03) (.36) (.32)
Log Product Area -.07** -.07** .62** .56**
(.01) (.01) (.05) (.03)
Common Colonizer .58** .58** .75** .75**
(.06) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Currently Colony .62* .64** .39* .38* .95** .95**
(.24) (.24) (.19) (.19) (.25) (.25)
Ever Colony 1.45** 1.43** 1.42** 1.42**
(0.10) (0.10) (.09) (.09)
Common Country .09 .09 .27 .27 -.95* -.95*
(.71) (.71) (.66) (.66) (.41) (.41)
R2 .61 .61 .85 .85 .69 .69
RMSE 2.1823 2.1822 1.3976 1.3975 1.9356 1.9354
Data set includes 449,220 bilateral annual observations covering 196 countries, 1950-2006. Robust standard
errors (clustered by country-pairs) in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked
with one (two) asterisk(s). Year eﬀects included but not recorded.
30Table 2: Sensitivity Analysis of Permanent Olympic Eﬀect on Exports
Fixed Eﬀects: None None Dyadic Dyadic Exporter, Importer Exporter, Importer
Olympics: Summer Either Summer Either Summer Either
Substitute Imports .51** .63** .45** .53** .58** .71**
for Exports (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.05)
Exporter-Speciﬁc .15** .36**
Trends (not levels) (.04) (.04)
Stripped Down 2.55** 3.27** .57** .69** .69** .86**
Gravity Model (.05) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Add Regional .21** .17** .25** .30** .31** .38**
Dummies (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Industrial .29** .31** .27** .33** .30** .34**
Importers (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Drop Latin America, .26** .28** .22** .32** .28** .42**
Caribbean Importers (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Drop African .34** .35** .28** .30** .36** .40**
Importers (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Drop Asian Importers .31** .34** .27** .31** .34** .39**
(.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Drop Middle Eastern .29** .33** .26** .29** .32** .37**
Importers (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Small Exporters .26** .26** .19** .24** .24** .30**
(Population<1m) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Poor Exporters .20** .19** .20** .23** .26** .30**
(Real GDP p/c<$1000) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Small Importers .33** .36** .26** .31** .32** .41**
(Population<1m) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Poor Importers .31** .33** .27** .30** .34** .40**
(Real GDP p/c<$1000) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop poor-poor and .20** .22** .15** .19** .23** .31**
small-small dyads (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Late Data .33** .35** .24** .28** .27** .34**
(year>2000) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Drop Early Data .30** .32** .19** .27** .27** .36**
(year<1960) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Drop 2.5σ Outliers .26** .26** .20** .23** .27** .33**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Weight by Real GDP .29** .31** .23** .29** .30** .37**
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Exporter plus Importer .29** .37** .29** .24** .44** .39**
Hosting (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02)
Exporter or Importer .23** .58** -.00 .29** .02 .49**
Hosting (.02) (.03) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.03)
Glick-Taylor (1870-1997) .47** .58** .33** .29** .37** .31**
trade eﬀect (.04) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Data set includes 449,220 bilateral annual export observations covering 196 countries, 1950-2006. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Regres-
sors included but not recorded: Log Distance; Log Exporter Population; Log Importer Population; Log Exporter
Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c; Currency Union dummy; Common Language dummy; Regional Trade
Agreement dummy; Common Border dummy; # Islands; Log Product Area; Common Colonizer dummy; Currently
Colony dummy; Ever Colony dummy; and Common Country dummy. Winter Olympics dummy also included but
not recorded in Summer Olympics columns. Year eﬀects included but not recorded. 31Table 3: The Eﬀects of Other Mega-Events on Exports in the Gravity Model
A. Eﬀects of Hosting Olympics and World Cup on Exports
Fixed Eﬀects: None None Dyadic Dyadic Exporter, Importer Exporter, Importer
Olympics: Summer Either Summer Either Summer Either
Olympic Eﬀect .25** .33** .20** .27** .23** .33**
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
World Cup Eﬀect .34** .34** .18** .19** .27** .27**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Olympic=World Cup? .11 .79 .76 .08 .45 .25
(p-value)
B. Eﬀects of Expos/World Fairs on Exports
Fixed Eﬀects: None None Dyadic Dyadic Exporter, Importer Exporter, Importer
Olympics: Summer Either Summer Either Summer Either
Olympic Eﬀect .24** .28** .08** .28** .28** .35**
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Worlds Fair/Expo Eﬀect .19** .22** .22** .06* .09** .06*
(.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Olympic=Worlds Fair? .45 .27 .00** .00** .00** .00**
(p-value)
Data set includes 449,220 bilateral annual export observations covering 196 countries, 1950-2006. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two)
asterisk(s). Regressors included but not recorded: Log Distance; Log Exporter Population; Log Importer
Population; Log Exporter Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c; Currency Union dummy; Common
Language dummy; Regional Trade Agreement dummy; Common Border dummy; # Islands; Log Product
Area; Common Colonizer dummy; Currently Colony dummy; Ever Colony dummy; and Common Country
dummy. Winter Olympics dummy also included but not recorded in summer Olympics columns. Year eﬀects
included but not recorded.
32Table 4: Eﬀects of Olympic Hosting and Candidacy on Exports
Fixed Eﬀects: None None Dyadic Dyadic Exporter, Importer Exporter, Importer
Olympics: Summer Either Summer Either Summer Either
Hosts .15** .28** .20** .25** .26** .31**
(.04) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.04)
Candidates .16** .14** .27** .21** .36** .27**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Host=Candidate? .79 .01** .11 .31 .02* 0.37
(p-value)
Data set includes 449,220 bilateral annual export observations covering 196 countries, 1950-2006. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two)
asterisk(s). Regressors included but not recorded: Log Distance; Log Exporter Population; Log Importer
Population; Log Exporter Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c; Currency Union dummy; Common
Language dummy; Regional Trade Agreement dummy; Common Border dummy; # Islands; Log Product
Area; Common Colonizer dummy; Currently Colony dummy; Ever Colony dummy; and Common Country
dummy. Winter Olympics dummy also included but not recorded in Summer Olympics columns. Year eﬀects
included but not recorded.
Table 5: Tetradic Estimates of Olympic Hosting/Candidacy Eﬀect on Exports
Olympics: Summer Either Summer Either Summer Either
Base Exporter USA USA Japan Japan Germany Germany
Base Importer UK UK France France Canada Canada
Eﬀect of Host/Candidacy .61** .38** .65** .38** .81** .38**
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Observations 534,820 534,500 521,887 523,207 515,063 513,628
Bilateral data set covers 196 countries, 1950-2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coeﬃcients
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Regressors included but not
recorded: Currency Union dummy; and Regional Trade Agreement dummy. Winter Olympics dummy also
included but not recorded in Summer Olympics columns. Year eﬀects included but not recorded.
33Table 6: Using a Treatment Methodology for Export Eﬀects
Olympics: Summer Either
Treatment Control
Host Candidate .08* .05
(.04) (.04)
Host or Candidate Non-Candidate .18** .19**
(.07) (.03)
Average Eﬀect of treatment on treated for bilateral exports, stratiﬁcation estimator.
Matching variables: Log Distance; Log Exporter Population; Log Importer Popula-
tion; Log Exporter Real GDP p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c; Common Language
dummy; and Common Border dummy. Bootstrapped errors in parentheses. Annual
observations on exports to developed countries.
Table 7: Aggregate Eﬀects using Multilateral Data
A. Aggregate Eﬀects on Export/GDP ratio using Multilateral Data
Summer Games Summer or Winter World Cup Any Event
Host Olympics .14* .14*
(.06) (.07)
Candidate for Olympics .14 .10
(.08) (.07)




B. Comparing Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Events on Aggregate Export/GDP Ratio







Each cell in A represents a separate OLS estimation, while each row in B represents a separate OLS esti-
mation. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls included but not recorded: log of population; log
of real GDP per capita; year eﬀects; country eﬀects. Annual data 1950-2006 for 182 countries.
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36Appendix
Table A.1: Data Sources
Bilateral Data Set
• FOB exports and CIF imports are measured in US$, taken from IFS Direction of Trade
CD-ROM, deﬂated by US CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), all items, 1982-84=100.
• Population and real GDP per capita (rgdpl) taken from PWT Mark 6.2. If PWT data are
unavailable, we use World Development Indicators.
• Country-speciﬁc data (on location, area, island-nation status, contiguity, language, colonizer,
and independence) taken from CIA World Factbook website.
• Currency-union data taken from Glick-Rose (2002).
• Regional trade agreements taken from WTO website
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/eif_e.xls
• Olympic hosts and candidate cities available from oﬃcial Olympics website
http://www.olympic.org/uk/games/past/index_uk.asp?OLGT=1&OLGY=1992
• World Cup hosting: http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/archive/index.html
Multilateral Data Set
• PWT Mark 6.2: Population; nominal GDP; nominal and real openness (exports plus imports
as percentage of GDP); real GDP p/c (PPP-adjusted)
• When PWT data are unavailable, we use World Development Indicators: Exports and Im-
ports (measured as percentages of GDP); Population; and Real GDP p/c (PPP).
37Table A.2: Country List
Afghanistan Congo, Dem. Rep. Honduras
Albania Congo, Republic Of Hong Kong
Algeria Costa Rica Hungary
American Samoa Cote D‘Ivoire Iceland
Andorra (a) Croatia India
Angola Cuba Indonesia
Antigua & Barbuda Cyprus Iran
Argentina Czech Rep Iraq
Armenia Czechoslovakia (b) Ireland
Aruba Denmark Israel
Australia Djibouti Isle Of Man (a)
Austria Dominica Italy
Azerbaijan Dominican Rep. Jamaica
Bahamas Ecuador Japan
Bahrain Egypt Jordan
Bangladesh El Salvador Kazakhstan
Barbados Eq. Guinea Kenya
Belarus Eritrea Kiribati
Belgium Estonia Korea, Rep.
Belize Ethiopia Korea N
Benin Faeroe Islands Kuwait
Bermuda Falk Is (b) Kyrgyzstan
Bhutan Fiji Laos
Bolivia Finland Latvia
Bosnia & Herzegovina Fr Guiana (b) Lebanon
Botswana France Lesotho
Brazil French Polynesia (b) Liberia
Brunei Gabon Libya
Bulgaria Gambia Liechtenstein (a)
Burkina Faso Georgia Lithuania
Burundi Germany Luxembourg
Cambodia Ghana Macau
Cameroon Gibraltar (b) Macedonia (FYR)
Canada Greece Madagascar
Cape Verde Greenland Malawi
Cayman Islands (a) Grenada Malaysia
C.A.R. Guadalupe (b) Maldives
Chad Guam Mali
Channel Islands (a) Guatemala Malta
Chile Guinea Marshall Islands (a)
China Guinea-Bissau Martinique (b)
Colombia Guyana Mauritania
Comoros Haiti Mauritius
Continued on Next Page...
38Table A.2 – Continued
Mayotte (a) Qatar Tajikistan
Mexico Reunion (b) Tanzania
Micronesia. (a) Romania Thailand
Moldova Russia Timor-Leste
Monaco (a) Rwanda Togo
Mongolia Samoa (a) Tonga
Montenegro (b) San Marino (a) Trinidad & Tobago
Morocco Sao Tome & Principe Tunisia
Mozambique Saudi Arabia Turkey
Myanmar Senegal Turkmenistan
Namibia Serbia Tuvalu
Nauru (b) Seychelles U.A.E.
Nepal Sierra Leone U.K.
Netherlands Singapore U.S.A.
Netherlands Antilles Slovakia Uganda
New Caledonia Slovenia Ukraine
New Zealand Solomon Is. Uruguay
Nicaragua Somalia Uzbekistan
Niger South Africa Vanuatu
Nigeria Spain Venezuela
North. Mariana Isl. (a) Sri Lanka Vietnam
Norway St. Helena (b) Virgin Isl. (U.S.) (a)
Oman St. Kitts & Nevis Wallis & Futuna
Pakistan St. Lucia West Bank & Gaza
Palau St. Pierre & Miquelon (b) Western Samoa
Panama St. Vincent & Gren. Yemen
Papua N.Guinea Sudan Yemen N (b)





Puerto Rico (a) Taiwan (a)
Note: (a) means aggregate date only; (b) means bilateral data only
39Table A.3: Hosts and Candidate Cities for Post-War Olympic Games
Year Summer Host Other Summer Candidates Winter Host Other Winter Candidates
1948 London, Baltimore, Lausanne, St. Moritz, Lake Placid.
UK Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Switzerland
Philadelphia
1952 Helsinki, Amsterdam, Chicago, Detroit, Oslo, Cortina d’Ampezzo,
Finland Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Norway Lake Placid
Philadelphia
1956 Melbourne, Buenos Aires, Chicago, Detroit, Cortina d’Ampezzo, Colorado Springs,
Australia Los Angeles, Mexico City, Italy Lake Placid, Montreal
Minneapolis, Philadelphia,
San Francisco
1960 Rome, Brussels, Budapest, Detroit, Squaw Valley, Innsbruck, Garmisch-Partenkirchen,
Italy Lausanne, Mexico City, Tokyo USA St. Moritz
1964 Tokyo, Brussels, Detroit, Vienna Innsbruck, Calgary, Lahti/Are
Japan Austria
1968 Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Detroit, Lyon Grenoble, Calgary, Lahti/Are,
Mexico France Lake Placid, Oslo, Sapporo
1972 Munich, Detroit, Madrid, Montreal Sapporo, Banﬀ, Lahti/Are, Salt Lake City
Germany Japan
1976 Montreal, Los Angeles, Moscow Innsbruck, Austria Denver, Sion, Tampere/Are,
Canada Originally Denver Vancouver
1980 Moscow, Los Angeles Lake Placid, Vancouver-Garibaldi
Russia/USSR USA withdrew before ﬁnal vote
1984 Los Angeles, None Sarajevo, Bosnia- Falun/Gteborg, Sapporo
USA Herzegovina/Yugoslavia
1988 Seoul, Nagoya Calgary, Cortina d’Ampezzo, Falun
Korea Canada
1992 Barcelona, Amsterdam, Belgrade, Albertville, Anchorage, Berchtesgaden,
Spain Birmingham, Brisbane, Paris France Cortina d’Ampezzo, Falun,
Lillehammer, Soﬁa
1994 Lillehammer, Anchorage, Oestersund/Are,
Norway Soﬁa
1996 Atlanta, Athens, Belgrade, Manchester, Nagano, Aoste, Jaca, Oestersund,
USA Melbourne, Toronto Japan (1998) Salt Lake City
2000 Sydney, Beijing, Berlin, Istanbul, Salt Lake City, Oestersund, Quebec City, Sion
Australia Manchester USA (2002)
2004 Athens, Buenos Aires, CapeTown, Turin, Italy (2006) Helsinki, Klagenfurt, Poprad-Tatry,
Greece Rome, Stockholm Sion, Zakopane
40Table A.4: Transitory Eﬀect of Olympics in Gravity Model
Fixed Eﬀects: None None Dyadic Dyadic Exporter, Importer Exporter, Importer
Summer -.01 .04 .07**
(.04) (.02) (.03)
Winter .10** .02 -.01
(.04) (.02) (.02)
Olympics -.05 .03 .03
(.03) (.02) (.02)
R2 .61 .61 .85 .85 .69 .69
RMSE 2.1843 2.1843 1.398 1.398 1.936 1.936
449,220 annual observations covering 196 countries, 1950-2006. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coeﬃcients signiﬁcant diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two) asterisk(s). Regressors included
but not recorded: Log Distance; Log Exporter Population; Log Importer Population; Log Exporter Real GDP
p/c; Log Importer Real GDP p/c; Currency Union dummy; Common Language dummy; Regional Trade
Agreement dummy; Common Border dummy; # Islands; Log Product Area; Common Colonizer dummy;
Currently Colony dummy; Ever Colony dummy; and Common Country dummy. Year eﬀects included but
not recorded.
41Table A.5: Determinants of Bidding for and Winning the Olympic Games
A. Probit Models of Bidding for and Winning the Olympic Games
Treatment Control Log(population) Log(Real GDP p/c) Log(Export/GDP)
Summer No Summer .42** 1.01** -.31
Bid Bid (.09) (.15) (.20)
Winter No Winter .29** 1.48** -.23
Bid Bid (.09) (.21) (.21)
Olympic No Olympic .36** 1.22** -.27
Bid Bid (.07) (.13) (.16)
Summer Failed -.23 -.43 -.64
Host Summer Bid (.28) (.52) (.63)
Winter Failed -.27 -.36 -1.37
Host Winter Bid (.52) (.98) (1.34)
Olympic Failed -.10 -.05 -.90
Host Olympic Bid (.22) (.44) (.53)
Probit estimation. Year eﬀects included but not recorded.
Coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two) asterisk(s).
B. T-tests of Bidding for and Winning the Olympic Games
Treatment Control Log(population) Log(Real GDP p/c) Log(Export/GDP)
Summer No Summer 9.1** 7.2** -4.5**
Bid Bid
Winter No Winter 7.8** 10.0** -2.4*
Bid Bid
Olympic No Olympic 10.9** 11.4** -3.9**
Bid Bid
Summer Failed -.0 .1 -.8
Host Summer Bid
Winter Failed .9 -.4 -2.0
Host Winter Bid
Olympic Failed 1.1 .0 -2.6*
Host Olympic Bid
Coeﬃcients signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at .05 (.01) marked with one (two) asterisk(s).
42Appendix A.6: Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: By equations (7) and (10), the diﬀerence in government utility from liberalizing subsequent
to not sending the signal satisﬁes
Uo
g − Ug = θ[u(˜ vo
x) − u(vx
c)] + u(˜ vo
m) − u(vm
c). (A.1)






x ) − φ) − u(px
cyx(k∗o
x ) − φ) ≥ 0. (A.2)
where φ ≡ (1 + r∗)k∗o
x . By equations (8) and (9), the diﬀerence in government utility from liberal-
izing subsequent to sending the signal satisﬁes
ˆ Ug − ˆ Uc
g = θ[u(vx
o − γπc) − u(˜ vc
x − γπc)] + [u(vm
o − (1 − γ)πc) − u(˜ vc
m − (1 − γ)πc)]. (A.3)
Diﬀerentiating with respect to θ yields




o − γπc) − u(˜ vc
x − γπc) ≥ 0. (A.4)
since vx
o ≥ ˜ vc
x. This proves Lemma 1.
43Notes
1Wikipedia provides estimates of the cost of the opening ceremony, while Table 2 of the 2008 World Development
Report reports that in Table 2, around a tenth of the 1.3 billion Chinese lived on less than $1/day.
2Another related reference is Greenestone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2008), who identify productivity spillovers
from new manufacturing plants by comparing the performance of incumbent plants in counties where new plants
locate to ﬁnalist “losing counties.”
3We focus our attention on the eﬀects of mega-events on trade rather than trade policy since the latter is diﬃcult
to measure. We have experimented with the Wacziarg-Welch measure of trade liberalization, and ﬁnd that it is
signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with past Olympic hosting or candidacy, taking into account time- and country-
eﬀects and controlling for country size and income. This result is quite consistent with the model we develop below.
However, we do not consider this avenue of research to be worth pursuing until we have better empirical measures
and models of trade liberalization.
4We have also clustered our standard errors in other ways, such as by (exporter x year) without changing our
results substantively.
5Even if our standard errors are oﬀ by a factor of two or three, the results remain signiﬁcant.
6If we advance the timing of the Olympic game dummies by ﬁve years (to correspond to the typical gap between
a city’s being awarded the games and actually hosting them), essentially no results are changed.
7The IOC states “From 1924 to 1960, all the Winter Olympics, with the exception of Oslo in 1952, were organized
in winter sports resorts.”
8Indeed, the eﬀects of diﬀerent summer games are also heterogeneous across years; the hypothesis of equal export
eﬀects from all games can be easily rejected at any reasonable signiﬁcance level. The eﬀects of the Tokyo and Seoul
games is typically estimated to be substantially larger than other eﬀects; the games of Mexico City seem to have had
a smaller eﬀect than most others. This might be an interesting issue to pursue in future research.
9We have also tried to estimate the Olympic eﬀect with short distributed lag models, without much success.
10For the sake of brevity, we do not report estimates for YW; we rarely ﬁnd it to be statistically signiﬁcant.
11That is, we set β2 = β4 = β6 = β7 = β8 = β9 = β10 = β11 = β12 = β13 = β14 = β15 = 0.
12We take our regional groupings from the World Bank, so that they include only developing countries. In particular,
we include dummy variables for: East Asia and the Paciﬁc; Europe and Central Asia; Latin American and the
Caribbean; the Middle East and North Africa; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa.
13Thirteen countries hosted the postwar summer Olympics in our sample, and an additional ﬁve have hosted games
but only in the Winter (a number of countries have hosted both, including Canada, Japan, and the USA).
14We use country codes from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics for these classiﬁcations.
15Still, the games have recently become so expensive that support from the national authorities is virtually con-
sidered a prerequisite for a successful application.
16These include information related to: travel times; accommodation; taxes; technology; security; natural disasters;
public opinion; the torch relay; test events; government support; customs formalities; the environment; marketing;
Paralympics; medical services; the Olympic village; media operations; and so forth.
17For instance, neither Sweden nor Finland have ever hosted the winter games, despite: a) numerous candidacies
(ﬁve by Swedish cities, six by Finnish cities), b) the fact that both countries have successfully hosted the summer
games, c) long winter sporting traditions, and d) the successful hosting of the winter games by a geographically and
economically similar country (Norway).
18Other results suggest that large, wealthier, and more closed countries are more likely to bid for and be awarded
either the Summer or Winter Olympics, relative to countries who do not bid. However, we ﬁnd no measurable eﬀect
of any characteristic on the determinants of success in being awarded the games, conditional on making a bid.
19 P1 of “Candidate Cities and Venues for the Winter Olympics” available at
44http : //multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en report 666.pdf
20Pp 4-5 of “Candidate Cities and Venues for the Winter Olympics” available at
http : //multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en report 666.pdf which continues: “Cities often apply to host the Olympic
Games in order to bring their urban and regional land development status more up to date. Two diﬀerent types
of development can be distinguished: developments directly linked to the Games, such as sports facilities and,
parallel developments, such as communications, telecommunications networks, public buildings, etc. These various
developments bring hope that the beneﬁts in terms of employment will be considerable (especially in the building
industry and engineering, commerce and touristic sectors), and more generally, that there will be an increase in the
local and regional economy and tourist trade. They are a long-term investment. The investments necessary are such
that the organising country, as well as the local authorities at all levels, have to make quite a signiﬁcant ﬁnancial
eﬀort. The Olympic “frenzy” makes it possible to accelerate the pace of ongoing developments, since the expenses
are covered by special funds.”
21This system worked smoothly through the joint hosting of the 2002 games by Korea and Japan, with only one
exception (the 1954 event was held in Switzerland, while the 1958 event was held in Sweden). We also note in passing
that there has been relatively little competition to host the World Cup, so that we are unable to plausibly compare
hosts and unsuccessful candidates, as we do below for the Olympics. Bids to host the World Cup were unopposed for:
1950, 1954, 1958, 1974, 1978, 1982, and 1986 (ﬁrst round). In most of the other years, only two candidates were pre-
pared to host the World Cup. More details are available at http : //en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FIFA World Cup hosts.
22There were world’s fairs as far back as mid-eighteenth century, but these are less well-known.
23Using “candidates” to refer to locales that bid for but were not awarded the games is not rigorous Olympic
jargon. The broadest set of cities is currently referred to by the Olympic movement as the set of “Applicant” cities,
which are potential hosts nominated by national Olympic committees. After a phase of about ten months some of
these are then chosen to become “Candidate” cities on the basis of a questionnaire and technical assessments. The
relevant criteria investigated include: government support, public opinion, general infrastructure, security, venues,
accommodation and transport. The candidate cities then go through a second phase of investigation by an evaluation
commission which includes another questionnaire and a site inspection. This information forms the basis for a report
issued by the commission, and the IOC then votes on the basis of the report. So, strictly speaking, “candidates”
include all ﬁnalists, both successful and unsuccessful.
24This is analogous to, e.g., the use of losing ﬁnalist counties in Greenestone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2008) as the
counterfactual to measure productivity spillovers from new manufacturing plants.
25Twenty-ﬁve countries have either bid for or hosted the summer games since WWII.
26Indeed, a similar argument has been made recently of the ongoing Asian race to put a man on the moon. In
“Why China wants to win” published in the International Herald Tribune on November 12, 2008, John Lee notes
that a moon-shot costs in excess of $100 billion, with little to show in the way of direct economic beneﬁt. However,
he argues that the prestige associated with getting to moon matters for national pride “which can serve as a unifying
force” as well as to enhance the “soft power” of the nation and command respect from foreign powers. He writes that
“Growing its economic and military might is about demonstrating the country’s capability.”
27Estimating our model with the non-linear method of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) would be computationally
challenging in the extreme, as would be including a comprehensive set of time-varying exporter- and importer-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects.
28We also include as controls the logs of population, real GDP per capita, and include year and country ﬁxed-eﬀects.
29We assume that bidding has no eﬀect per se on the economy’s fundamentals.
30We assume that capital markets are open throughout (while liberalization only takes place in goods markets)
for simplicity. The eﬀect of generalizing the model to allow for liberalization of frictions in international capital
movements would be ambiguous, depending on whether opening capital markets would favor the import or export
sectors. This could depend in part on the relative capital intensity of these sectors. However, in cases where the
liberalization of capital markets would favor the export sector, the results should mirror those we ﬁnd for trade
liberalization.
31As discussed above, the IOC has explicit criteria for selecting the Olympic host. Almost all these criteria concern a
candidate’s abilities to host the games successfully, ignoring any beneﬁt that the candidate might receive from hosting
45the games. We could easily augment the model by making the selection process a function of these characteristics.
This would not change our qualitative results, as long as there was some residual amount of uncertainty about the
selection. As noted above, there seems to be a considerable amount of such randomness.
32We know of only one counter-example; Denver backed out of hosting the winter games in 1976 when voters
rejected a bond issue to ﬁnance the event. Similarly, we also rule out signals by countries that have no chance of
winning the rights to host the games. This assumption is implicit in our speciﬁcation that π, the probability of
winning hosting rights conditional on bidding, is common across countries. By way of contrast, many countries have
promised to liberalize trade without following through.
33The welfare function is speciﬁed in terms of earnings in each sector for simplicity. This function is assumed to
encompass all proceeds in these sectors relevant for the consumption of private agents, including any redistribution
of government tariﬀ revenues and the eﬀects of other trade distortions that yield diﬀerential valuations of domestic
prices under closed and open policies.
34In practice, the false signal could also aﬀect domestic prices, as it aﬀects the domestic capital allocation across
sector. As a result, the “closed prices” under oﬀ-equilibrium path strategies may diﬀer from those speciﬁed above.
Accordingly, we state our conditions for separating equilibria below in terms of sectoral revenues under these strategies,
which implicitly include any secondary price distortions associated with capital allocations due to false signaling.
35There are also examples of unsuccessful Olympic candidates who liberalized. For instance, South Africa began
a dramatic trade liberalization in the mid 1990s while it mounted (and lost) its bid to host the 2004 Olympics (the
choice of Athens was announced in September 1997). In the words of the WTO “South Africas average most favoured
nation (MFN) tariﬀ rates for all goods fell from over 14% in 1996 to 8% in 2001; the MFN rates for industrial goods
also fell by 50% and 55% for textiles and clothing respectively over the same period...”
http : //www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/casestudiese/case38e.htm
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